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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Disposition of Insurance Policy of Bankrupt Assignee
Who Was Not Beneficiary-Bankrupt, by a valid assignment, acquired an
insurance policy on the life of an unrelated third person, under which bankrupt
was not the beneficiary. He tendered the cash surrender value to the trustee,
claiming under § 7oa (5) of the Bankruptcy Act I which provides that when a
bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value pay-
able to himself, he may pay such value to the trustee and continue to hold the
policy. Held, that the entire policy passes to the trustee despite bankrupt's
tender, because the privilege given under the Act applies only to policies held by
the bankrupt on his own life.2 In re Beachley, i F. Supp. lO4 (D. Md. 1937).
Most of the decisions which are pertinent to this Section of the Bankruptcy
Act may be roughly divided into two groups, those in which the bankrupt is the
insured, and those in which he is the beneficiary. In the first group, the courts
have greatly favored the bankrupt, holding that where the policy has no cash
surrender value,2 or is pledged for a loan equal to or in excess of the value,4 and
also where the bankrupt has not reserved the right to change the beneficiary," the
bankrupt keeps the policy and the trustee takes nothing.6 In these decisions, the
courts have given effect to the intention of Congress, which was to procure for
the trustee the sum available to the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy,7 but
otherwise to leave to the insured the benefit of his insurance." Whether the
courts will follow this policy in cases where the bankrupt is the beneficiary is not
well settled. At least one case 9 holds that a policy under which the bankrupt
i. 30 STAT. 565 (I898), I1 U. S. C. A. § IIo (a) (1927). "The trustee . . . shall
be vested . . . with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudged a
bankrupt, except in so far as it is to property which is exempt, to all . . . property which
prior to the filing of the petition he could be any means have transferred . . . Provided,
That when any bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value
payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may . . . pay or secure to
the trustee the sum . . . and continue to hold, own, and carry the policy free from the
claims of the creditors . . . otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustees as assets ..
(the words "Provided, That" are omitted from U. S. C. A.).
This Section should be construed in the light of § 6 of the same Act, 30 STAT. 548 (0898),
Ii U. S. C. A. § 24 (1927). In accordance with the latter Section, a policy of insurance which
is exempt under the law of the state does not pass to the trustee. Holden v. Stratton, 198
U. S. 202 (1904).
2. The court also decided that the bankrupt could not claim that the policy was wholly
exempt under 2 MD. AwN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 83, § 8. Instant case at o5-1o6. No
attempt is made in this article to discuss the various state exemption laws. For such a dis-
cussion, see Note (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 236. The state exemption statutes will be
found listed at 238, n. 12.
3. it re Garnon, 247 Fed. 932 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917). "Cash surrender value" refers not
only to that value which is inherent in a policy by its terms, but also to the value accorded
to the policy by the practice of the company issuing it. Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U .S. 202
(19o6) ; In re Greenspan, 8 F. Supp. 582 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
4. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 (1913). Outstanding loans less than the cash
surrender value are deducted. In re Cooper's Estate, 28 F. (2d) 438 (D. C. Md. 1928).
5. In re Simmons & Griffin, 255 Fed. 521 (C. C. A. ist, 1919).
6. It might seem from the Section that only those policies which have a cash surrender
value may be redeemed, all others passing to the trustee as assets.
7. Despite the wording of the Section, it is universally decided that the sum is fixed at
the time of the filing of the petition, not of the adjudication. The trustee's rights are also
fixed at this time. Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474 (913).
8. See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 473 (1913) ; instant case at io8.
q. Curtis v. Humphrey, 78 F. (2d) 73 (I935), 34 MicH. L. REv. 1028 (1936).
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owner 10 is the beneficiary will not pass to the trustee when it is pledged for a
loan in excess of the surrender value. But there are dicta in several other cases
to the effect that § 7oa (5) applies only where the bankrupt is the insured.1
However, in the instant case, the bankrupt was neither the insured nor the bene-
ficiary, and the court decided that the purpose of Congress could not be stretched
to cover such a set of facts. This is done without benefit of direct precedent 12
but not without some difficulty, since the case which is the most closely related,
Curtis v. Humphrey,3 rules the other way. There the bankrupt was the assignee
of a policy on her husband's life, but she was also the beneficiary. The instant
court felt called upon to distinguish this decision carefully, pointing out that the
bankrupt was a very close relative of the insured as well as beneficiary of the
policy, but admitting that no emphasis was placed on these points.'4 Yet it is this
personal interest of the bankrupt which should be stressed. Although § 7oa (5)
is not expressly limited to policies in which the bankrupt has a personal interest
either as insured or as beneficiary, such a restriction must be read into it or there
would be no reason for its existence. Otherwise it would treat assigned insurance
policies, such as the one found in this case, as a special type of asset, and there
is no reason, economic or otherwise, for doing so. Stripped of its personal
attributes, an insurance policy is nothing more than a chose in action, and should
pass to the trustee as such. Thus, it may be concluded that the court in the
instant case, by interpreting the words "shall have any insurance policy" 15 to
mean "shall have any insurance policy on his own life", has followed the spirit if
not the strict letter of the law.
Conflict of Laws-Effect of Stipulation that Contract Be Construed by
Law of State Having No Relation to Contract-In an action for the breach
of an employment contract entered into in Indiana, stipulating that the law of
Florida should govern it, the lower court excluded proof of the Florida law in
interpreting a clause of the contract.' Held, that the proof was correctly ex-
cluded since no connection was shown between the contract or the parties thereto
and the State of Florida.2 Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 192 Atl.
158 (R. I. 1937).
The rule that parties to a contract may select the law by which they intend
to be bound and by which their contract is to be governed 3 has the almost uni-
versal qualification that the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction which has
io. Where the bankrupt is the beneficiary but not the owner of the policy, the disposition
depends on whether or not the owner has reserved the right to change the beneficiary. If he
has not, the bankrupt's interest remains an asset of the estate which passes to the trustee.
Wolter v. Johnson, 34 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929). If he has reserved the right, the bank-
rupt does not have any interest in the policy to pass to the trustee. In re Hogan, 194 Fed.
846 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912).
1i. See Clements v. Coppin, 61 F. (2d) 552, 558 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) ; Lincoln Nat. Life
Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F. (2d) 582, 584 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
12. "It is clear that the rule . . . only applies to cases where the bankrupt was the
assured." Clements v. Coppin, 61 F. (2d) 552, 558 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), cited supra note ii.
This case is cited by the instant court at io8, seemingly as an afterthought, and is not em-
phasized.
13. 78 F. (2d) 73 (1935), 34 Mica. L. REv. 1O28 (1936).
14. Instant case at lo6.
15. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), II U. S. C. A. § io (a) (1927). See supra note i.
i. The clause in question read: "The artist shall at all times and places produce and
present his act to the entire satisfaction of the show." The case hinged on whether the
Florida or Indiana interpretation of "satisfaction" should apply.
2. There was also a question of the admissibility into evidence of certain motion pictures,
which is not discussed here. See instant case at i6o.
3. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) § 332.2; 2 WHARTON, CoxFLiCT OF LAws (1905)
§ SO (b).
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some connection with the making or performance of the contract,4 or, at least,
of a jurisdiction where one of the contracting parties is domiciled.5 Another re-
restriction is that under no conditions must there be any suspicion of bad faith.
To this extent, the courts are willing to give effect to the expressed contractual
intention. 7 However, it would seem that the limitations placed upon the selec-
tion of the jurisdiction are unnecessarily strict. Perhaps it is true that if the
question is one which goes to the existence of a contract and which involves its
validity, the parties should not be able to choose at random the law which they
desire to control their agreement. There exist in all jurisdictions strict legal rules
for the determination of the capacity of the parties, the relation between offer and
acceptance, consideration, and the legality of the subject matter of a contract.
These rules are founded on the public policy of the state. They cannot be
changed directly by the express agreement of the parties,8 and the refusal of a
court to allow them to be changed indirectly by designating the law of another
state to govern the contract is understandable, although some courts have leni-
ently permitted a limited 9 selection of the law which should control even in
these cases.' 0 However, when the point in dispute is one merely of the construc-
tion or interpretation of a term of the contract, as in the instant case, the appli-
cable rules of the forum are not strictly adhered to, but supposedly yield to the
expressed intention of the parties." Clearly, the sole objective of the court
should be to ascertain the meaning of the language employed in the contract.
In so doing, there would seem to be no valid objection to applying whatever
law the parties choose to select. 2 However, the court in the instant case failed
to recognize this seemingly basic distinction and reached an unfortunate decision
supported by rules which should have had no application.' s
4. Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F. (2d) 73o (C. C. A. 3d, 193o), aff'g 43 F.
(2d) 724 (E. D. Pa. 193o), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 897; Clark v. Gibbs, 69 F. (2d) 364 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1934) ; Mayer v. Roche, 77 N. J. L. 681, 75 Atl. 235 (1909) ; Manufacturers
Finance Co. v. Johnson & Co., 15 Tenn. App. 236 (1931); 6 PAGE, CONTRAcTS (1922) § 3571.
5. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. New Eng. Inv. Shares, Inc., 25 F. (2d) 493 (D.
Mass. 1928); Allen v. Riddle, 141 Ala. 621, 37 So. 68o (19o4) ; Steinman v. Midland Sav-
ings & Loan Co., 78 Kan. 479, 96 Pac. 86o (i9o8); Jenkins v. Union Savings Ass'n, 132
Minn. 19, 155 N. W. 765 (I1i6).
6. The earliest application of this limitation was Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65 (U. S.
1839), and it has been universally followed ever since.
7. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933) 47 HARv. L. Rzv. 173,
185; Falconridge, Contract and Conveyance in the Conflict of Laws (933) 81 U. OF PA. L.lR'v. 661, 671.
8. For instance, in a jurisdiction where by statute a seal does not of itself give formality
to and validate a contract with no other consideration, an agreement that it shall do so is in-
valid. See Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 354 Ili. 554, 567, x88 N. E. 836, 842
(1934) ; WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1628; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
§580 (1).
9. It is limited by the requirement that there be a connection between the contract and
the state chosen. See supra notes 4 and 5.
lo. Mayer v. Roche, 77 N. J. L. 68i, 75 Atl. 235 (199o) (capacity) ; Carey v. Mackey,
82 Me. 5i6, 2o At. 84 (1890) (validity of contract) ; Brown v. Gates, 120 Wis. 349, 97 N.
W. 221 (19o3) (legality of the subject matter) ; Hale v. Cairns, 8 N. D. 145, 77 N. W. lOlO
(x898) (usury); Crawford v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry., 86 Wash. 628, i5O Pac. I155 (1915)
(usury).
ii. Young v. Illinois Athletic Club, 310 Ill. 75, 141 N. E. 369 (1924) ; State Line & Sul-
livan R. R. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 277 Pa. 227, 12o At. 829 (1923) ; WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(Rev. ed. 1936) § 202; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 227, comment a (4)-
12. See Fidelity Loan Security Co. v. Moore, 280 Mo. 315, 322, 217 S. W. 286,289 (1919);
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § i9; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §248, com-
ment b.
13. Since the parties must naturally be permitted to agree as to what shall constitute
performance and discharge under the contract, it would also seem proper to let them select
the law which should govern where the dispute is on the question of performance or dis-
charge, as in the instant case, and in most cases involving interpretation of terms of the
contract.
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Constitutional Law-Validity of Statute Limiting Sentence for Prison
Escape to Term Not Exceeding Original Sentence-The petitioner, who
was serving a three to six year term for breaking and entering with intent to
commit a felony, escaped from the penitentiary. Upon his recapture he was sen-
tenced to a like term under a statute that provided, inter alia, ". . . if any
prisoner . . . shall break such penitentiary or jail . . . such person shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction of such offense, shall be sentenced
to undergo an imprisonment, to commence from the expiration of his original
sentence . . . for a period of time not exceeding the original sentence. .... " I
In his writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged that the statute was unconsti-
tutional as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2  Held, that the statute is constitutional, because the classification upon
which it is based is reasonable. Commonwealth ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 325
Pa. 305, 188 Atl. 841 (I937), cert. granted, 57 Sup. Ct. 924 (1937).
At early common law it was a felony to break prison, but this was changed
by an English statute 3 which made it either a felony or a misdemeanor, depend-
ing upon the original sentence of the prisoner.4 In this country, statutes have
either followed this distinction,5 or have fixed the same penalty for all prisoners.6
Statutes similar to the one in the instant case but for the omission of the words
"not exceeding" have been held unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection
of the laws.7 However, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid classification
which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction, s and the mere fact that "it
is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality" I does not mean that the equal protection clause has been violated.
Thus, it is taken as a matter of course that different sentences may be imposed
upon individual offenders for the same offense.' 0 Also, it has been held that a
statute may provide that a prisoner twice convicted of a felony shall lose his
privilege of parole.11 Moreover, the analogous habitual offender statutes have
been upheld as constitutional,'2 sanctioning reference to the criminal's past record
of offenses in order to fix his sentence. The reasons for and the bases of this type
of classification are the varying criminal propensities, degree of culpability and
potential menace to society of the criminals.'3 These factors are at the root of
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 18, § 251. Indiana is the only state having an
extant statute like the Pennsylvania Act. IND. STAT. (Baldwin, 1934) § 2651.
2. In his argument of unconstitutionality, petitioner averred that, for the same offense
of prison escape, unequal sentences are provided, depending upon the duration of a former
sentence. The petitioner points out that a fellow prisoner who escaped with him and who
was captured at the same time received a sentence of only one to two years because that was
the extent of his original sentence. See instant case at 3o6-3o7, i88 Atl. at 841.
3. Statute De frangentibus Prisonain, 13o7, I EDw. II, stat. 2.
4. 2 BIsHOP, CRImIl.AL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § lO76; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th
ed. 1932) § 2o19.
5. E. g., N. Y. CoNs. LAWs (Cahill, 1930) C. 41, § 169.
6. E. g., CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§ 105, 107, 1O8.
7. it re Mallon, 16 Idaho 737, 3O2 Pac. 374 (39o9) ; State v. Lewin, 53 Kan. 679, 37
Pac. 168 (1894).
8. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (885) ; Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-
Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936), citing Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 423 (935).
q. Justice Van Devanter in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78
(i9iI), in stating the rules for testing whether the equal protection clause has been violated.
io. Howard v. North Carolina, 191 U. S. 126 (39o3).
ii. Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481 (908).
12. McDonald v. Massachusetts, I8o U. S. 311 (19O); Graham v. West Virginia, 224
U. S. 616 (3932) ; People v. Coleman, 145 Cal. 6o9, 79 PaC. 283 (39o4) ; People v. Gowasky,
244 N. Y. 451, 155 N. E. 737 (1927).
13. Harno, Rationale of a Criminal Code (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 549, at 554: "If
the object [of punishment] is to protect society, the emphasis shifts from the particular
offense to the personality of the offender. The whole system of the penal law as it now
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the Pennsylvania statute, and if punishment has for its purpose, at least in part,
the protection of society, such a classification must be approved as both reasonable
and desirable.'-
Corporations-Power of Court to Order Issuance of Certificate to Pur-
chaser of Shares at Sheriff's Sale Without Surrender of Outstanding Certifi-
cate-A judgment debtor in Iowa owned shares in a Nebraska corporation.
After levying on the shares by statutory attachment and garnishment proceed-
ings,' the creditor sued in Nebraska on the Iowa judgment, seeking to have the
shares sold to satisfy his judgment. A decree was entered by default, granting
this relief and directing the corporation to issue a certificate to the purchaser at
the sale. Held, that the court had the power to require the corporation to issue a
new share certificate without a surrender of the old certificate.2 Danborn v. Dan-
born, 273 N. W. 502 (Neb. 1937).
It has frequently been decided that corporate shares have such an existence
at the corporate domicile that they may be levied upon or attached by service on
the corporation,' although the certificate and the holder thereof are outside the
jurisdiction.4 In the present case, the corporation objected that it might incur
stands stresses the offense. But if protection is the aim, the principal inquiry should be as to
the dangerousness of the offender. It is he whom society has to fear. To find out how
much it has to fear him.it must diagnose him to determine his motivations, his anti-social
tendencies, his personality, and his responsiveness to peno-correctional treatment."
14. It is submitted that the difference between the Pennsylvania statute and those stat-
utes involved in the Mallon and Lewin cases, both supra note 7, is one of degree rather than
of kind. The fact that one is discretionary and the other mandatory would seem to affect
only the desirability of one over the other, but not the constitutionality. Such differences also
exist among the habitual offender statutes: compare N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41,
§§ 1941, 1942, as antended it N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1936) c. 41, §§ 1941, 1942
(mandatory) with PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 19, § 922 (discretionary).
In State v. Johnsey, 46 Okla. Cr. 233, 287 Pac. 729 (1930), a statute like the one in the
instant case was declared unconstitutional. The court relied on the Mallon and Lewin cases,
both supra note 7, and did not distinguish the two types of statutes; nor did the instant court.
But see In re Mallon, i6 Idaho 737, 749, io2 Pac. 374, 377 (9o9).
I. NEB. ComP. STAT. (1929) §§ 20-1519, 20-1520.
2. Although unimportant for purposes of this discussion, there appeared in the case the
further fact that the debtor had transferred the shares to his wife. There was a finding that
this transfer was in fraud of creditors, and the decree provided that it be set aside and that
the ownership of the shares be adjudged to be in the debtor.
3. Shares of stock were not subject to levy under execution or attachment at common
law, being regarded as in the nature of a chose in action. Foster v. Potter, 37 Mo. 525
(1866) ; see Howe v. Starkweather, 17 Mass. 24o, 243 (1821). But they were generally
made so by statute. MAss. GEN. STAT. (1804) c. 83, Howe v. Starkweather, 17 Mass. 240,
243 (1821) [the present statute is MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) C. 214, § 3 (8)]; MICH. C. L.
(1871) § 6112, VanNorman v. Jackson County Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 204, 7 N. W. 796
(i88i) [the present statute is MICH. ComP. LAws (1929) C. 266, § 14593] ; Mo. R. C. (855)
p. 742, §§ 23, 24, Foster v. Potter, 37 Mo. 525 (x866) [the present statute is Mo. Rsv. STAT.
(1929) § 1293].
4. Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling & Devel. Co., i57 Cal. i6, io6 Pac. 98 (19o9);
Young v. South Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 2 S. W. 202 (1886) ; Chesapeake & 0. R.
R. v. Paine & Co., 29 Gratt. 502 (Va. 1877). There are converse decisions to the effect that
the certificate itself may not be levied upon. Winslow v. Fletcher, 53 Conn. 390, 4 Atl. 250
0885) ; Armour Bros. Pack. Co. v. St. Louis Nat. Bank, 113 Mo. 12, 20 S. W. 69o (1892) ;
Christmas v. Biddle, 13 Pa. 223 (i85o) ; Ireland v. Globe Milling & Reduction Co., 19 R. I.
18o, 32 Atl. 921 (1898). There are fewer but more recent decisions declaring that the certifi-
cate is subject to levy on attachment or execution. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. R. v. Clarks-
dale, 257 U. S. 47 (1921) ; Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp.,
267 U. S. 22 (1924) ; Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., I65 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896
(1900).
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liability to a holder of the outstanding certificate, but the court declared that a
garnishee acting pursuant to the judgment of a court would not incur subsequent
liability.5 Since legislatures have generally remedied the formerly existing in-
equity of withholding shares owned by a debtor from attachment by his creditor,6
it would be an inept conclusion to maintain that the purchaser at the sheriff's sale
acquired title to the shares and yet was not entitled to a certificate,7 a result that
would make his ownership of the shares virtually incapable of being transferred.
Nor could the court have required the judgment debtor to surrender the certifi-
cate, since he was out of the state and did not make an appearance. Therefore, it
must be conceded that the court acted properly under the existing statute. Never-
theless, the fact remains that there is left open an evident opportunity for the
defrauding of an innocent purchaser of one or the other of the two certificates
that represent the same shares of stock. The outstanding certificate may be trans-
ferred subsequently, or it may already have been transferred without registration
on the books of the corporation." Thus, there is presented a conflict between two
meritorious goals, one the desire to permit creditors access to shares owned by
defaulting debtors; the other, the desire to increase the safety and acceptability
of such investments and to capitulate to an undoubted commercial need by pro-
moting the negotiability of and free trading in share certificates. 9 The problem
may best be solved, and the conflicting interests reconciled, by adoption of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, which carries out the concept of certificates as rep-
resenting the shares and controlling title, and tries to make them freely negoti-
able.10 This Act, which has been adopted by twenty-four states, but not by
Nebraska, provides for the attachment of the share certificate itself, and stipulates
that any attachment or levy shall be invalid unless the certificate be attached, or
surrendered to the corporation, or its transfer be enjoined.1 It also facilitates the
task of a creditor seeking to reach a certificate, by providing that, in attaching the
certificate or in satisfying the claim by means thereof, he shall be entitled to such
aid, by injunction and otherwise, as is allowed at law or in equity.' 2 Uniform
5. Accord: Friedlander v. Slaughterhouse Co., 31 La. Ann. 523 (1879); Peterson v.
Kingman, 59 Neb. 667, 81 N. W. 847 (1oo) ; see Gamble v. Dawson, 67 Wash. 72, 83, 120
Pac. io6o, xo64 (1912).
6. See supra note 3.
7. But see Harris v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 75 Olda. io5, 1o7, 182 Pac. 85, 87
(1913). In Parkhurst v. Almy, 222 Mass. 27, io9 N. E. 733 (1915), the court refused to
require the corporation to issue a new certificate on the ground that such action would cause
an overissue of capital stock, but declared that the judgment creditor must procure certifi-
cates for an equal number of shares to those he sought to attach, and put them in trust to be
surrendered to the corporation, if it should turn out that the certificate in the debtor's name
had or thereafter should come to the hands of a bona fide purchaser.
8. In the first case, the buyer or pledgee would take nothing. Young v. South Tredegar
Iron Co., 85 Tenn. i89, :2 S. W. 202 (1886); Shenandoah Valley R. R. v. Griffith, 76 Va.
913 (1882) ; cf. Braden's Estate, 165 Pa. 184 (895). As to the rights of a prior unregistered
transferee, there are many conflicting decisions. Some hold that the prior unregistered trans-
feree is protected. Athol Savings Bank v. Bennett, 203 Mass. 481 (1909) ; Smith v. Ameri-
can Coal Co., 7 Lans. 317 (N. Y. 1873) ; Eby v. Guest, 94 Pa. i6o (i88o). Contra: Berney
Nat. Bank v. Pinckard DeBardelaben & Co., 87 Ala. 577, 6 So. 364 (1888) ; Security Com-
mercial & Savings Bank v. Imperial Water Co., 183 Cal. 488, 192 Pac. 22 (i92o) ; Hexter v.
Shahan, 66 Colo. 156, i8o Pac. 92 (I919).
9. See Union Trust Co. v. Oliver, 214 N. Y. 517, 523, io8 N. E. 8og, 8ii (1914), for a
statement that parties who deal in certificates innocently have long been protected "upon
principle analogous to that governing commercial paper."
10. UNIFORM STOcK TRANSFER AcT, 6 U. L. A. (1922) §§ 1, 5, 6.
ii. Id. § i3.
12. Id. § 14. Under this Section, where a court has enjoined the transfer of shares, the
holder of the certificate may properly be ordered to transfer it to the officer of the court ap-
pointed to make sale of it to satisfy the claim of the creditor. Rioux v. Cronin, 222 Mass.
131, io9 N. E. 898 (IPI5). Compare 6 U. L. A. (1922) §§ 13, 14, with similar provisions in
the UNIFORM WAREHOUSE REcEipTs AcT, 3 U. L. A. (1922) §§ 25, 26, and in the UNIFORM
SALES Acr, I U. L. A. (1931) §§ 39, 40.
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adoption of this Act would seem to be the most efficacious method yet proposed of
solving the problems presented by the instant case."3
Negligence-Liability of a Vendor to Third Person Injured by De-
fective Chattel Equipped by Vendor with New Accessories-Defendant
vendor put a new truck tire on a wheel which had a cracked rim and lock ring,
giving notice of the defective condition to the driver. Subsequently, the plaintiff,
a repairman, while removing the wheels before adjusting the brakes, was injured
by the bursting of the defective lock ring. Held, that if the defendant owed a
duty to third persons, he discharged it by giving notice of the defect to his cus-
tomer. Wissman v. General Tire Co. of Phila., Inc., 192 Atl. 633 (Pa. 1937).
The majority opinion, in its disposition of the novel situation presented in
the instant case, tread carefully in refusing to recognize categorically the existence
of a duty upon the defendant.' Most jurisdictions 2 have veered away from the
old rule that a vendor is liable for negligence in the construction of a chattel only
to those in privity of contract.3  The modern trend has been to predicate liability
on the breach of a duty to act carefully in the interests of third persons.4 This
duty is based on the probability of bodily harm if the chattel is defective for the
13. A problem in conflict of laws is suggested by this case, although it does not arise
under the facts as they exist. As explained previously, the applicable Nebraska statute pro-
vided for attachment of the shares of stock at the office of the corporation, and the court took
the position that the certificate was bare evidence of title. But in Iowa, where the debtor and
presumably the certificate were located, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act has been adopted.
If the creditor, proceeding under that Act, had had the certificate attached in Iowa, would
the Nebraska court have recognized the validity of the proceedings as an effective transfer
of the title of the shares to the creditor? On this general subject, see Note (1937) 85 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 522.
I. The court felt that the case could be decided without taking a definite stand on that
issue. Instant case at 634.
2. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916); Johnson v.
Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 2d, I919), 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 400 (192o) ;
Heckel v. Ford Motor Car Co., ioi N. J. L. 385, 128 Atl. 242 (1925) ; Grant v. Australian
Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85; RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1934) § 395 et seq.; Note (1929) 77
U. OF PA. L. REV. 388; (1934) 22 CALr. L. REv. 359; see also Bohlen, Liability of Mant-
facturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees (1929) 45 L. Q. REv. 343; Rus-
sell, Manufacturer's Liability to the Ultimate Consumer (1933) 21 Ky. L. J. 388; Underhay,
Manufacturers' Liability: Recent Developments of Donoghue v. Stevenson (1936) 14 CAN.
B. Rav. 283 (for English development) ; Note (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 664.
Those courts not recognizing the modem trend as a new approach to the problem attain
the same result by referring to the situation in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. as a further
exception to the old "privity of contract" rule. Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733,
7 P. (2d) 1013 (1932) ; McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, I S. W. (2d) 122
(1927).
Pennsylvania, by implication in the present opinion and other recent cases, has commit-
ted itself to the modem view. See instant case at 634; Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 Atl. 700 (1929) ; Menaker v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk
Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76, 189 Atl. 714 (937) (cases concerning foodstuffs) ; Cantner v. Castle,
322 Pa. 166, 185 Atl. 264 (1936) ; Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 126 Pa. Super. 351,
362, 19i At. 384, 389 (1937) (commented upon in this issue of the REVIEW at 107).
3. The old rule, a development from a misinterpretation of the opinion in Winterbottom
v. Wright, io M. & W. 1O9 (Ex. 1842), is illustrated by the following cases: Bragdon v.
Perkins-Campbell Co., 87 Fed. lO9 (C. C. A. 3d, 1898) ; Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255,
44 N. E. 457 (1896); Blakemore v. Bristol & E. Ry., 8 E. & B. 1035 (Q. B. 1858). For
critical discussion and collection of cases, see HARPER, LAW OF TORT (1933) § io6; Notes
(1908) 56 U. OF PA. L. REV. 55, (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 664, 40 HARv. L. REv. 886.
4. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) ; HAPa, loc.
ci. supra note 3; Bohlen, loc. cit. supra note 2; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 395 et seq.
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purpose for which it was intended.5 In this respect, the concurring opinion, by
clearly acknowledging the defendant's duty, takes an unusually liberal viewpoint. 6
The concurring judge finds no ground for distinguishing between the cases where
the defendant creates the dangerous condition 7 and the present case, where it is
claimed the danger results from an "adaptation" s of the defective part by the
defendant to his work. Thus, when a chattel is returned by a repairman after
he has finished his task, the customer looks on that part of the chattel which was
worked upon as a completed job, and naturally assumes that the repairman, as a
responsible person, would have notified him of any defects discovered in the
chattel which would make his work lack the perfection it appears to have. Fur-
thermore, the relationship in the instant case would seem sufficiently close to
permit the establishment of an affirmative duty, even though the defendant has
not actively caused the danger." Another reason in support of the duty is that
the burden of the duty on the defendant would be light, since he would properly
be required only to make a reasonable attempt to give notice to the driver and
his employer, the ones most likely to be affected by the dangerous condition.'0
Finally, the imposition of this slight duty might often prevent the possibility of
great injury, and at the same time would not too severely penalize the neighbor-
hood repairman who does odd jobs and has few financial resources. It is hoped
that the Pennsylvania court, when it is faced squarely with the problem, will take
the liberal step forward indicated in the concurring opinion."
5. See supra note 4. An additional factor necessary before a duty will arise is the prob-
ability that third persons will come in contact with the chattel in the ordinary course of
events.
6. The concurring opinion, by Justice Stem, goes on to relieve the defendant from lia-
bility because the intervening negligence of the driver (using the truck in its bad condition)
superseded the "negligence" of the defendant and became the proximate cause of the injury.
It is better modern law, though a few cases hold to the contrary, that intervening negligence
of a third party between the act and the injury will not break the causal chain of events if it
was foreseeable or not highly extraordinary when it was done, as seems to be the case here.
Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (E. D. Mich. 1918) ; Teasdale v. Beacon
Oil Co., 266 Mass. 25, 164 N. E. 612 (1929) ; Trusty v. Patterson, 299 Pa. 469, 149 Atl. 717
(1930) ; Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N. W. 855 (x928) ; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1934) § 393, 396, 447; cf. Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. (2d) 688, 59 P. (2d)
100 (1936). Contra: Old Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 66, 140 S. W. 1047 (Ig1).
For general discussion of intervening cause, see article by Professor Laurence H. Eldredge,
in the next issue of the REvIEw.
7. Rosebrook v. General Electric Co., 236 N. Y. 227, 14o N. E. 571 (1923) ; Griffith v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 305 Pa. 386, 157 Atl. 791 (193) ; Bisson v. John B. Kelly, Inc., 314
Pa. 99, 17o Atl. 139 (I934); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, III N. E.
1050 (1916) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 388, 394, 395, 398, 4o4. These are distinguished
from the present situation by the majority opinion. See instant case at 634.
8. Instant case at 634. However, the present factual arrangement seems to be covered,
at least literally, by the RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 403, caveat, wherein: "The Institute
expresses no opinion that a contractor, who fails to exercise reasonable care to inform his
employer of a dangerous condition, which he is not employed to repair, but which he dis-
covers in the course of making the repairs agreed upon and of which lie realizes that his
employer is unaware, may not be subject to the liability stated in this Section." Yet, it is
suggested that the present case, where the defective part of the chattel is "adapted" by the
repairman to his work, may be distinguished, for the purpose of founding a duty of notice,
from the case where a defect is accidentally discovered in another part of the chattel than
that utilized by the repairman.
9. The relationship here is not more distant than that in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. and other cases cited supra note 2; cf. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. i6o,
159 N. E. 896 (1928) ; HARPER, LAW OF TORT (1933) § 81.
I0. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 388, comment L.
ii. Cf. Bergstresser v. Van Hoy, 142 Kan. 88, 45 P. (2d) 855 (1935) ; Hanson v. Black-
well Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 255 Pac. 939 (1927).
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Public Officers-Validity Under State Constitution of Pennsylvania
"Ripper" Legislation-Quo warranto proceedings were brought against new
appointees under a Pennsylvania statute that purported to create, in third class
counties, new Boards for the Assessment and Revision of Taxes, identical, how-
ever, with those "abolished", except for a transfer of the appointing power.'
Held, that since there was no actual abolition of office, the statute violated the
Pennsylvania constitutional provision that "appointed officers . . . may be
removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed." 2
Commonwealth ex rel. Smillie v. McElwee, 193 Atl. 628 (Pa. 1937).
Another statute "abolished" existing Civil Service Commissions in first class
cities and established new commissions, identical, however, with the -former
bodies except for an increase in membership and a shift of the appointing power.3
Held, that the statute was unconstitutional on the same ground as in the McElwee
case, and also because it contravened the provision that "no law shall extend the
term of any public officer or increase or diminish his salary or emoluments. .. " ,4
Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v. Clark, 193 Atl. 634 (Pa. 1937).
These cases represent an important part of the litigation arising from the
recent "Ripper" Acts.' In the construction and application of the governing con-
stitutional provisions already quoted,6 two problems arise: in the first place,
whether, in the absence of positive restrictions on another mode of removal, those
provided by the constitution are exclusive as to statutory officers; and secondly,
recognizing that the legislature may, without violating any constitutional pro-
vision, abolish offices of its own creation, whether there had been such an aboli-
tion here. In regard to the first problem, Bowman's Case 8 decided that a con-
stitutional officer could be removed only in accordance with the disputed pro-
vision. In extending the doctrine to the case of a statutory officer, the instant
court professed to follow a well-settled rule, 0 but actually chose between two
i. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 256. This Act provides that appointments to the "new" boards
shall be made by the Auditor-General of the Commonwealth instead of by the County Com-
missioners, as formerly. For the organization, powers and duties of the "old" boards, see
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 72, § 5342.
2. PA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 53, § 3325 and note, amended by Pa. Laws
1937, no. 187. Under the previous statute, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 53, § 3325,
the commission was composed of three members elected by a majority vote of City Council.
The only changes made by the new Act were an increase in the membership to five, and a
provision that the Mayor and City Controller should appoint two each, and the four thus
selected should appoint a fifth.
4. PA. CoNsT. art. III, § 13.
5. See infra notes 13, 14 and 17 for additional cases.
6. Although elected by City Council and County Commissioners, the officers in question
are appointed officers within PA. CONST. art. VI, § 4. Commonwealth ex rel. Lowell v. Hoyt,
254 Pa. 45, 98 AtI. 782 (1916) ; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Likeley, 267 Pa. 310, 11o At. 167
(1920). These cases, however, deal with removal by the appointing power.
PA. CoNsT. art. III, § 13 applies also to statutory officers. Commonwealth ex rel. v.
Moffitt, 238 Pa. 255, 86 AtI. 75 (913) ; Tucker's Appeal, 271 Pa. 462, 114 AtI. 626 (1921).
7. Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa. 213, 35 AtI. I99 (1896) ; Cowell v. Ayers, iio Tex. 348, 220
S. W. 764 (1920) ; Bogue v. Seattle, ig Wash. 396, 53 Pac. 548 (1898). So also, where a
condition of tenure is attached to the office at the time of its creation, PA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4
has been held inapplicable. Milford Township Supervisors' Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 139 Atl.
623 (927).
Constitutional offices, however, may not be abolished by the legislature. Massenburg v.
Commissioners of Bibb County, 96 Ga. 614, 23 S. E. 998 (1895) ; Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa.
213, 35 AtI. I99 (1896) ; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Erie County Commissioners, 23 Pa. Dist.
203 (914).
8. 225 Pa. 364, 74 Atl. 203 (i9o9).
9 PA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4.
io. Clark case, 193 Atl. at 637.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
diametrically opposed viewpoints displayed in the earlier cases." However, the
choice seems reasonable, since to hold otherwise would have rendered meaning-
less the constitutional protection against diminishing the salaries of public offi-
cers. 12  In regard to the second problem, since the legislature was not the ap-
pointing power, the removal of the incumbents could be validated only by an
actual abolition of their offices.'" Although the statutes expressly declared that
the legislative purpose was to abolish the "old" office, the qualifications, powers
and duties of members remained the same and changes were confined to increasing
the membership and transferring the appointing power.' 4 This the court properly
regarded as merely ousting the incumbent while continuing the office. Although
the precise situation was one of first impression in Pennsylvania, other courts,
under similar circumstances, had steadfastly refused to uphold the appearance for
the reality.15 Furthermore, an important factor influencing the instant decisions
seems to have been the utter disregard, by the legislature, of the basic concepts
of local self-government, considered by the court as inherent in the American
constitutional system.16 Although it is true that the instant holdings have no
ii. One view, based chiefly on dicta in Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436, 439, 441
(1867), pronounced before the adoption of the present constitution, denied any limitation on
the legislative power to shorten the terms of statutory officers. Commonwealth ex rel. Kelly
v. Sanderson, I Pa. Dist. 714 (1891) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Keen v. McComsey, 12 Pa.
Dist. 39 (19o2); see Commonwealth v. Moir, igg Pa. 534, 548, 49 Atl. 351, 355 (19o);
Richie v. Philadelphia, 225 Pa. 511, 517, 74 Atl. 430, 432 (19o9) ; Donohugh v. Roberts, ii
W. N. C. 186, 189 (Pa. C. P. 1881). In Commonwealth ex rel. Braughler v. Weir, 165 Pa.
284, 30 Atl. 835 (895), the court expressed the theory of the McCombs case as one of its
reasons for upholding the constitutionality of a statute which, in reorganizing borough gov-
ernment throughout the state, incidentally cut short the term of a chief burgess elected under
a special act. But the court also held that the new office differed materially from that sup-
planted. Of all these cases, only the Sanderson case considered PA. CONsT. art. VI, § 4.
The other view, now the authoritative one, although based mainly on Bowman's case,
has found expression in cases dealing with statutory officers. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lowell
v. Hoyt, 254 Pa. 45, 53, 98 Atl. 782, 784 (1916) ; Georges Township School Directors, 286
Pa. 129, 133, 133 Atl. 223, 224 (1926) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Kelly, 322 Pa. 178, 187, i85
Atl. 307, 311 (1936). These cases, however, did consider the disputed constitutional pro-
vision.
12. PA. CONsT. art. III, § 13.
13. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v. Cantrell, 193 Atl. 655 (Pa. 1937) where an Act
(Pa. Laws 1937, no. 109) was held effectively to have abolished the Board of Viewers in
first class counties by transferring its functions to the newly created Board of Revision of
Taxes.
In Commonwealth ex rel. v. Green, Common Pleas Court No. 6, Phila. Legal Intelli-
gencer, Aug. 21, 1937, p. I, col. 2, a statutory provision (Pa. Laws 1937, no. 285, § 2) ending
the terms of the members of the Board of Mercantile Appraisers in first class cities without
even purporting to abolish the offices, was declared invalid. By construing prospectively the
provision changing the appointing power, the court held that portion constitutional.
14. Cf. Suermann v. Hadley, 193 Atl. 645 (Pa. 1937) where the court, in dealing with
a series of statutes (Pa. Laws 1937, Acts no. 1O8, IIi, 112) which, among other things, reor-
ganized the Board of Revision of Taxes in Philadelphia, held unconstitutional a provision
(Pa. Laws 1937, no. iii, § 8) terminating the offices of the existing members without ex-
pressly abolishing the offices. The remaining portions of these Acts were, however, declared
valid. But since all inconsistent acts were expressly repealed, this should have sufficed to
abolish the old offices, the qualifications for which differed materially from those for the new.
See PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 53, §§ 4791, 4792. The mere incident that the in-
cumbents possessed the necessary qualifications under the new Acts should have been imma-
terial.
15. State ex rel. Birdsey v. Baldwin, 45 Conn. 134 (1877) ; Case of Gibbes, I Desauss.
587 (S. C. i8oo) ; State ex rel. v. Leonard, 86 Tenn. 485, 7 S. W. 453 (1888).
16. The greater portion of Justice Maxey's opinion in the McElwee case was devoted to
this point. But see infra note I8.
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application where the modifications are more than colorable, 17 nevertheless they
do prevent sham abolition of public office in contravention of constitutional restric-
tions. Thus, it is believed that the court has done much to further the politically
desirable goal of "home rule" in Pennsylvania."'
Taxation-Personal Property Tax on Capital Stock of Domestic Cor-
poration Having Business Situs Outside the State-A New Jersey corpora-
tion was granted certiorari on an order of the New Jersey Board of Tax Appeals
affirming an assessment of a tax on the corporation's paid-in capital stock and
accumulated surplus, which had acquired a "business situs" in New York. Held,
that New Jersey had jurisdiction to tax intangible property of a domestic cor-
poration although such property had acquired a "business situs" in another state.
Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 193 Atl. 912 (N. J. 1937).
This decision seems opposed to the present tendency of the courts to avoid
multiple taxation of intangibles, as developed in a former issue of the REWvEw. 1
The New Jersey court was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that New York
had imposed no tax on the property.2 However, this would not seem to be suffi-
cient grounds for the decision. The right of the domiciliary state to tax under
the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam, is 'a legal fiction,3 created so that
intangibles might not entirely escape taxation. Therefore, where there is a defi-
nite situs for taxation," the need for the rule is gone, and by analogy to the law
regarding taxation of tangible personal property,5 the domiciliary state should not
have jurisdiction to tax.6
Torts-Liability in Trespass on the Case for Personal Injuries Result-
ing from Negligent Misrepresentations-Plaintiff sustained physical inju-
ries when the safety device on a washing machine wringer failed to work because
of a latent defect, discoverable by reasonable inspection. This action was brought
17. Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v. McBride, Common Pleas Court No. 7, Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Aug. 7, 1937, p. I, col. 2. Here, the new Magistrates' Court Act (Pa. Laws
1937, no. 368) was under attack. Since the duties and powers of the new Chief Magistrate
differed materially from the old, its constitutionality was upheld. On the principles laid down
in the instant cases, the decision seems fundamentally sound.
18. PA. CoNsT. art. XV, § I contains the so-called "Home Rule" amendment to the Penn-
sylvania constitution. But in the absence of an enabling act, the provisions therein evidently
mean nothing in the way of actually providing for home rule in Pennsylvania.
I. (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 427, commenting upon Commonwealth v. Madden's Ex'r,
97 S. W. (2d) 561 (Ky. 1936), where the court held that Kentucky had no jurisdiction to
tax the interest of one of its citizens in partnership securities which had acquired a "business
situs" in New York.
2. See instant case at 914.
3. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 28o U. S. 83, 93 (1929).
4. Where intangibles have acquired a "business situs" in a state other than that of the
domicile of the owner, they are taxable in that state. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S.
309 (1899) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395 (1907).
5. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 328 (1932). The court ex-
plains here that the doctrine of inobilia sequuntur personam, as applied to tangible personal
property, was discarded when a definite situs for taxation, the place where the property is
kept and used, was found.
6. If the domiciliary state is allowed this jurisdiction, the possibility of double taxation
on the same property will exist. Therefore, in this situation, it would seem to be the -iser
and more equitable course to forget the fiction inobilia sequintur personam, for, ". . . this
maxim is invariably observed, that no fiction shall extend to work injury; its proper opera-
tion being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might result from the gen-
eral rule of law." 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (Lewis' ed. 1897) 43.
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against the seller who had warranted the machine to be free from defects and had
made representations as to the advantage of the instant operation of the safety de-
vice. Held, that trespass on the case was available because the action was based
on negligent rather than intentional misrepresentations.' Ebbert v. Philadelphia
Electric Co., 126 Pa. Super. 351, 191 Atl. 384 (1937).
The instant case is apparently the first in which a Pennsylvania appellate
court has allowed recovery for injuries resulting from negligent misrepresenta-
tions in an action of this sort. In England the law is well settled that a defendant
who negligently misrepresents a fact, no matter how great his negligence, will not
be held liable in tort if he honestly believed the truth of his statement. 2 There,
liability is predicated upon the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of his state-
ment (scienter), the remedy for such intentional misrepresentation being the tort
action of deceit.3 Although some American jurisdictions have accepted the lim-
ited English doctrine,4 others, realizing the injustice of refusing redress to a
plaintiff injured by reliance upon negligent misstatements, have attempted to cir-
cumvent the rule in various ways in order to hold this type of negligent defendant
liable.' As a substitute for the scienter element in deceit, a majority of these
courts have adopted either a dubious principle known as the "personal knowledge"
rule," or the equally fictitious "conclusive presumption of knowledge" doctrine.
7
A few jurisdictions have frankly stated that deceit would lie when defendant's
assertion was not based upon reasonable grounds, 8 while at least one court has
gone so far as to rule that falsity in fact is the sole requisite for the maintenance
of such an action." No matter what name the courts have given their respective
formulae, the result of this rejection of the classical definition of scienter has been
a confusion of the fundamental differences, present in all tort law, in the liability
i. In case of a vendor-vendee relationship, if plaintiff could establish a warranty as here,
he would have an action in contract for breach of warranty in which he could recover even
consequential damages. "The general rule is that a contracting party is liable for damages
which are the natural consequence of the breach." Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. Wood &
Co., 249 Pa. 423, at 433, 94 Atl. 1o67, at l070 (1915). See 2 WmLISTON, SALES (2d ed.
1924) § 614a. The scope of this report is limited, however, to tort remedies.
2. Angus v. Clifford, [18g1] 2 Ch. 449 (C. A.), wherein Lindley, L. J., stated, at 469,
that an action for a negligent, as distinguished from a fraudulent, misrepresentation could not
be supported. The basis for the decision was a dictum in the celebrated case of Derry v.
Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 376 (1889), which case merely decided that actual fraud must be
proved to sustain an action for deceit. See (1891) 7 L. Q. REV. 310.
3. The classical definition of scienter is laid down by Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek,
14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889).
4. Hindman v. First Nat. Bank, 112 Fed. 931 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o2) ; Cantwell v. Harding,
249 Ill. 354, 94 N. E. 488 (1911); Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 41 N. E. 414 (1895);
Lamberton v. Dunham, 165 Pa. I29, 3o Atl. 716 (1895).
5. Morris, Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation (193o) 64 U. S. L. REV. 121.
6. Kirkpatrick v. Reeves, 121 Ind. 28o, 22 N. E. 139 (1889); Chatham Furnace Co. v.
Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, i8 N. E. 168 (1888) ; Bullitt v. Farrar, 42 Minn. 8, 43 N. W. 566
(1889). The rule has been stated as follows: "One who states, as of his own knowledge,
material facts, susceptible of knowledge, in ignorance of their truth or falsity, is liable to
another induced to rely thereon, though the former believed them to be true." Morris, supra
note 5, at 127.
7. Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482 (r896). The doctrine has also been called
the "special means of knowledge rule". Davis v. Central Land Co., 162 Iowa 269, 275, 143
N. W. lO73, 1075 (1913). In Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696, 15 So. 584 (894), the court
held that a false representafion might be made scienter, even if defendant did not know of
its falsity, where, from his special means of knowledge, it became his duty to know the truth
or falsity of the representation made.
8. Wardlaw v. Pace, 66 S. W. (2d) 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), 12 TEX. L. REV. 525
(1934). Other states have reached a similar result by statute. CAL. Cirv. CODE (Deering,
1931) §1572, 1710; MONT. REv. CODE (935) § 7575; N. D. ComP. LAWS (1913) § 5944;
S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 816.
9. Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N. W. 581 (i9o8); cf. Moulton v. Norton, 184
Minn. 343, 238 N. W. 686 (1931), 31 MiclH. L. REv. 138 (1932).
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for intentional and unintentional wrongs. For by holding the defendant liable in
deceit in these circumstances, the courts have imposed upon him the liability of
an intentional tortfeasor when his only fault has been negligence.' 0 Despite
the criticism this has called forth from several eminent legal scholars,", only
three states have recognized this distinction between negligent and intentional
misstatements in giving redress for harm resulting from reliance upon false repre-
sentations. 2 The Pennsylvania court's decision, in line with the holdings of these
three states, is commendable not only because it recognizes that negligent mis-
representations resulting in injury should entail some kind of liability (thus
avoiding the injustice of the English view to which Pennsylvania had heretofore
adhered) ,'3 but also because it bases this liability properly upon general principles
of negligence rather than upon a distorted principle of deceit.
Trusts-Apportionment of Mortgage Loss Between Life Tenant and
Remainderman-Trustees foreclosed mortgages, bought in the properties at
sheriff's sale, and after an interval, sold them for less than the amounts secured
by the mortgages. On appeal from the lower court's apportionment of the pro-
ceeds between life tenants and remaindermen,' held, that the share of the net
proceeds allocated to income should be the proportion which the total income loss
bore to the total of both principal investment and income loss, the income loss
being computed by allowing the current rate of return on trust investments for
the entire period between default and eventual resale. Nirdlinger's Estate, 193
Ati. 30 (Pa. 1937).
Ruling for the first time upon this question, the court rejected the method
of income computation applied in the lower court, and discussed in a recent issue
of the REvIEw, 2 where the mortgage rate of interest had been allowed until fore-
closure and the current rate thereafter until resale.3 Instead, the court adopted
the rule announced in the Restatement of Trusts' and in the Uniform Principal
io. For an able discussion of the differences in the extent of liability between fraudulent
and negligent misrepresentations and the possibility of the defense of contributory negligence
to the latter type of situation, see Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated
as Negligence or Fraud? (1932) 18 VA. L. Rxv. 703.
ii. Bohlen, Misrepreseittation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty (1929) 42 HARv. L.
REv. 733; Bohlen, loc. cit. supra note IO; Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent
and Innocent Misrepresentation (1930) 24 ILL. L. REv. 749, 9 ORE. L. REv. 413; Jeremiah
Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (I9OO) 14 HARv. L. REv. 184. For the contrary
point of view to the effect that absolute liability even for negligent misrepresentation is
proper, see Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 HARv. L. Rnv. 415.
12. Segal v. Carroll Furniture Co., 51 Ga. App. 164, 179 S. E. 775 (1935) (personal
injuries) ; Cunningham v. Pease Furnishing Co., 74 N. H. 435, 69 Atl. 120 (I9O8) (personal
injuries) ; Maxwell Ice Co. v. Brackett & Co., So N. H. 236, 116 Att. 34 (1921) (financial
loss) ; Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922) (financial loss).
13. Lamberton v. Dunham, 165 Pa. 129, 30 At. 716 (1895), cited supra note 4; Warren
Balderston Co. v. Integrity Trust Co., 314 Pa. 58, 17o Atl. 282 (1934) ; cf. Erie City Iron
Works v. Barber & Co., io6 Pa. 125 (1883).
I. 26 Pa. D. & C. 3 (1936).
2. (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 126.
3. This method had been adopted in accordance with the views expressed in Bailey and
Rice, The Duties of a Trustee with Respect to Defaulted Mortgage Investments (1935, 1936)
84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 157, 172-178, 625-628. Accord: Matter of Otis, 158 Misc. 8o8, 287
N. Y. Supp. 758 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; Matter of Marshall, 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 550
(Surr. Ct. 1904) (where the holding was to this effect despite language to the contrary).
4. RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 241. No case authority was cited by the court, and,
indeed, few cases are in accord with this view: Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 5 Redf. Surr. 264
(N. Y. 1881) ; Matter of Myers, 161 N. Y. Supp. iiII (Surr. Ct. 1916) ; Phelps' Estate, 162
Misc. 703, 295 N. Y. Supp. 84o (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; Quinn v. First Nat. Bank, 168 Tenn. 30,
73 S. W. (2d) 692 (1934).
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and Income Act,5 which applies the current rate throughout. This rule is based
on the theory of an "equitable conversion" dating from the default. 6 Although
probably intended as a step toward uniformity, the instant decision is contrary to
the weight of case authority both here 7 and in England," in not allowing the
mortgage rate to continue at least until the date of foreclosure.9 Furthermore,
when the current rate is thus applied as of the date of default, the necessity of
determining that exact date arises and needlessly presents a potential difficulty
in the already complicated process of apportionment. And where, as here, the
intent of the testator is of no assistance in choosing a method, certainly the most
practical rule should govern.
Trusts-Power to Render Declaratory Judgment as to Use of Trust
Funds for Purchase of Corporate Stocks-Trustees of a trust fund, which
included among its assets shares of stock in private corporations, were given
authority to change investments at their discretion without confinement to "legal
investments". On appeal from a declaratory judgment to the effect that the
trustees might invest in common and preferred stocks of private corporations,
held, that the petition should have been dismissed, since it did not present a case
justifying such a declaration, under the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act.' Carwithen's Estate, Pa. Sup. Ct., Phila. Legal Intelligencer,
October II, 1937, P. I, col. 2.
The opinion of the Philadelphia Orphans Court, which rendered the judg-
ment appealed from, 2 opening this new field of investment to the trustee without
making him liable as an insurer, was discussed and approved in a former issue
of the REvIEw 3 as being economically sound and desirable and as representing
the present trend. The Supreme Court, in its reversal, evaded the real issue by
deciding the case on purely jurisdictional grounds. This decision, arrived at by
a strict adherence to precedent in the construction of the statute,4 is to be regretted
5. § II, 9 U. L. A. (Supp. 1936) 2O.
6. A duty having arisen on the part of tfie trustee to convert the trust property upon
default into other forms of investment, equity "considers as done that which ought to have
been done", and allows interest as though the principal had in fact been so invested; hence
the current rate of return. See Note (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 805.
7. Hagan v. Platt, 48 N. J. Eq. 206, 21 Atl. 86o (i89i) ; Trenton Trust Co. v. Donnelly,
65 N. J. Eq. 119, 55 Atl. 92 (19o3) ; Matter of Chapal, 269 N. Y. 464, igg N. E. 762 (1936) ;
Matter of Pelcyger, 157 Misc. 913, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; Wallace v. Wal-
lace, go S. C. 61, 72 S. E. 553 (ig1) ; see Equitable Trust Co. v. Swoboda, 113 N. J. Eq.
399, 401, 167 Atl. 525, 526 (1933). Accord: In re Plumb, 27 Ont. L. R. 6ol (1898). See
also cases cited supra note 3.
8. In re Moore, 54 L. J. Ch. (N. s.) 432 (1885) ; In re Horn, [1924] 2 Ch. 222; Stewart
v. Kingsale, [1902] I Ir. R. 496.
9. See (1936) 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 126, in support of the contention that the mortgage
rate should logically be allowed for the period between default and foreclosure.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 831, amended by PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
Supp. 1936) tit. 12, § 836. This Act allows declaratory judgments to be rendered only where
an actual controversy exists or where there are antagonistic claims which indicate imminent
and inevitable litigation. According to the Supreme Court, neither of these statutory requi-
sites were present in the instant case, inasmuch as the trustees had not made up their minds
to make such investments and there was no indication that they would be made if the declara-
tion were granted. Such a decree, therefore, if granted, would be reduced to mere advice
which the court had no power to give. For a similar decision, see In re Sterrett's Estate, 300
Pa. 116, ,5o Atl. 159 (193o).
2. 28 Pa. D. & C. 66 (1937).
3. (937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 647.
4. Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925) ; In re Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa.
386, 152 Atl. 675 (1930) ; In re Straus' Estate, 313 Pa. 407, 17o AtI. 263 (1932).
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in that it negates the authority of an opinion which was recognized by both the
business and the legal worlds as an advisable and necessary change in the law.5
Thus Pennsylvania is left committed, for the present at least, to a traditional
view 6 to which there no longer seems reason for adhering.
Trusts-Refusal to Apportion Cash Dividends Between Successive Life
Tenants-A corporation, shares of which were held in trust for successive
life beneficiaries, for ten years paid dividends varying from $800o to $15,ooo,
paid nothing the two following years, and then declared a cash dividend of $25,000
the year following the death of the first beneficiary.1 Held, that the entire divi-
dend, though earned before the death of the first beneficiary, should be awarded
to the second beneficiary, since it is subject neither to equitable apportionment
nor to distribution on a per diem basis under § 22 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917.2
Nirdlinger's Estate, 193 Atl. 33 (Pa. 1937).
The common law rule that dividends were payable to the person entitled to
the income at the date of declaration has been considerably modified. On the one
hand the rule has been changed by the Pennsylvania doctrine of equitable appor-
tionment,3 under which the source of those dividends deemed "extraordinary"
will be investigated and the payment apportioned according to the period during
which the profits were earned.' On the other hand, the old principle has been
varied by the per diem apportionment provided for by the Fiduciaries Act, but
this has been construed as applicable only to "ordinary" dividends.5 In the
instant case, the disputed dividend was considered neither "extraordinary"
enough for equitable apportionment, nor sufficiently "ordinary" for the Fiduciaries
Act to apply. 6 However, the apparent illogicality of this analysis arises mainly
from the terminology, for the terms are used in relation to separate problems;
5. Many states have already adopted this more liberal view. Fox v. Harris, 141 Md.
495, i1g Atl. 256 (1922); In re Buhl's Estate, 211 Mich. 124, 178 N. W. 651 (1920) ; Smyth
v. Burns, 25 Miss. 422 (1853) ; Willis v. Brancher, 79 Ohio 29o, 87 N. E. 185 (19o9); see
also RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 227.
6. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1892) § 1O74.
I. The mortgage issue of this same case below was the subject of a separate appeal.
Nirdlinger's Estate, 193 Atl. 30 (Pa. 1937) ; see case note in this issue of the REviEw,
at 1O9.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §634: "All annuities, and all payments of
rents, income, interest, or dividends of any real or personal property, directed by any will to
be made during the lifetime of the beneficiary . . . shall, like interest on money lent, be
considered as accruing from day to day, and shall be apportioned to the date of the death of
such beneficiary ..
3. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
4. Known as the "Pennsylvania rule" but accepted by nearly all American jurisdictions.
CooK, COR1P TIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 554. For general history of apportionment, opposing
theories, etc., see Matter of Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, 458, 1O3 N. E. 723, 724, 50 L. P. A.
(N. s.) 510 (1913), 62 U. OF PA. L. REV. 470; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 461, 139 Atl.
200, 202 (1927), 56 A. L. R. 1287 (1928). For analysis of apportionment in Pennsylvania,
see Brigham, Pennsylvania Rides Governing the Allocation of Receipts Derived by the Trs-
tees from Shares of Stock (937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 358. The typical apportionment case
is a dispute between tenant and remainderman concerning dividends earned before and de-
clared after the death of the testator. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857) ; Stokes' Estate
(No. 1), 240 Pa. 277, 87 Atl. 971 (1913), 62 U. OF PA. L. REv. 224 (1914). It is settled,
however, that the same principles are applicable to disputes between successive life tenants.
Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 146 Atl. III (1929) ; Neafie's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 6o8, 618
(0936).
5. See Thompson's Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C. 503, 5o6 (1925) ; Given's Estate, 323 Pa. 456,
461, i85 Atl. 778, 780 (1936).
6. Instant case at 37. Lower court opinion, Nirdlinger's Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C. 3, i8
(1936) : "This introduces into the law of dividends a third classification...
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and the degree of regularity required for the application of the Fiduciaries Act
has no necessary connection with the question whether a dividend is irregular
enough to justify an investigation into its source.7 In a dictum explaining why
the present dividend could not be considered extraordinary, the instant court
emphasized that it was a cash dividend, and implied that this was a determinative
factor. 8 It is true that in most cases where an apportionment has been granted
the dividend has been in stock,' because of the fact that corporations generally
employ the stock dividend form for spasmodic distributions of accumulated
surpluses. But it has not been the form of these payments that has caused the
courts to characterize them as extraordinary, but rather their unusual size and
the irregularity of the intervals; for the opinions following the "Pennsylvania
rule" have consistently stated that the medium of payment is immaterial to the
classification of dividends for purposes of apportionment. 10 Indeed, it has been
on this basis that the Massachusetts practice of categorically awarding cash to
tenants and stock to remaindermen "- has been condemned as arbitrary.12  Yet
the formal distinction suggested by the instant case seems to be a step toward
the principle underlying this Massachusetts rule of convenience, and an unfor-
tunate departure from the Pennsylvania tradition that "in a court of equity . . .
substance is never sacrificed to form." 13
Trusts-Tracing Trust Res Into Several Accounts Constituting Single
Fund-Claimants sought priority in the distribution of the insolvent trust
company's assets for the amount of commissions wrongfully taken by the trust
company and mingled with its own cash. The trust company carried three cash
accounts (cash, cash items, and deposits in other banks) whose lowest combined
balance between the time the commissions were taken and the trustee became
7. But see Thompson's Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C. 503, 5o6 (925), where it seems to be im-
plied that § 22 of the Fiduciaries Act applies to all dividends not subject to equitable appor-
tionment.
8. See instant case at 37-38. Because of appellant's failure to except at the proper time,
this issue was not brought up on appeal. Hence, the discussion of it is not part of the direct
holding.
9. See instant case at 37; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Peckham, 42 R. I. 365,
372, 107 At. 2o9, 212 (1919). Cash dividends that have been apportioned in Pennsylvania
have usually been either disguised stock dividends (i. e. cash plus subscription rights),
Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 Atl. 438 (1891) ; or payments arising from the sale of capital
assets, Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434 (1882). But note Oliver's Estate, 136 Pa. 43, 2o Atl.
527 (i889), where a straight cash dividend was treated as extraordinary and would have
been apportioned had not the earnings been found to have arisen wholly within the tenancy.
In other jurisdictions following the Pennsylvania rule, straight cash dividends have been
apportioned. Foard v. Safe Deposit Co., 122 Md. 476, 89 Atl. 724 (1914) ; Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Peckham, supra. See also RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (935) § 236 (b),
comment s, and illustration.
io. See Matter of Osborne, 2o9 N. Y. 450, 477, 1O3 N. E. 723, 731 (1913) ; Earp's Ap-
peal, 28 Pa. 368, 374 (857) ; Mandeville's Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 370, 133 Atl. 562, 563 (1926);
THom PsON, COR'ORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 5403; Brigham, supra note 4, at 372.
ii. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. ioi (1868).
12. See Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434, 441 (1882) ; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Peckham, 42 R. I. 365, 370, 107 Atl. 2 9, 211 (1919) ; THOMpsON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed.
1927) § 5399.
13. McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 84, io6 Atl. i89, 191 (1919).
For the purpose of avoiding too great a number of cases requiring the difficult and com-
plicated accounting of an apportionment, it may be necessary to narrow the definition of
extraordinary dividends, but this can be done along traditional lines by merely raising the
standard of irregularity required for apportionment of all types of dividends. For discussion
of the practical difficulties of apportionment, see Bryan v. Aiken, io Del. Ch. 446, 463, 86
Atl. 674, 682 (1913).
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insolvent was less than the amount of the beneficiaries' claim. Held, that the
claimants were entitled to priority in the distribution, and could proceed at their
option to take their proportionate share of the lowest combined balance of the
three accounts and of securities purchased therefrom, or could enforce an equi-
table lien against both parties to the extent of their claim.1 Erie Trust Company's
Case (No. ), 326 Pa. 198, I91 At. 613 (937).
It seems established in Pennsylvania that a beneficiary of a trust will be
granted priority over general creditors in the distribution of the assets of an
insolvent trustee 2 only where the trust res can be traced into some specific fund,
property or assets.3 This rule was purportedly followed in the present case,4 but
the court proceeded to permit the beneficiaries to satisfy their claim from the
three different cash accounts of the trust company, although the only evidence was
that the claimants' money had been mingled with the general cash of the bank and
that thereafter numerous transfers between the accounts had taken place.5 In the
court's opinion, the three accounts constituted "a single fund, sufficiently differ-
entiated from the company's general assets" to meet the requirements of specific
tracing, on the ground that transfers among them were so frequent that their only
practical difference was one of bookkeeping. 6 Nevertheless, it would seem that
constant interchanges of funds between different accounts do not destroy the
identity of the accounts themselves. Therefore, since the claimants did not trace
their money beyond the general cash account, the inclusion of the cash items and
cash in other banks accounts in the funds from which the beneficiaries could
satisfy their claim appears to be a relaxation of the rule of specific tracing to the
detriment of the interests of other creditors.7 The instant case also permitted
the beneficiaries to go against securities purchased from the cash accounts in the
interim. Because the balance remaining was less than the beneficiaries' claim,
the court refused to apply the presumption that the first money withdrawn from a
mingled fund is the trustee's." It is noteworthy that the court, for the first time,
adopted § 202 of the Restatement of Trusts,9 relying on it as the sole authority on
i. The court also held that the provisions of the Department of Banking Code, PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 7i, § 733-1011, placing claims for deficiencies in
estates and surcharges with respect to estates on a level with the claims of general creditors,
did not apply in the present case since the claimants were seeking the return of their own
property which had been wrongfully taken. Instant case at 202, 191 Atl. at 6,5.
2. Certain Pennsylvania cases have distinguished between individual and corporate trus-
tees, requiring strict tracing in the case of the corporate trustee, but allowing recovery to the
beneficiary upon mere tracing of his money into an individual trustee's cash funds. See
Hirsch, Tracing Trust Funds-Modern Doctrines (1936) II TEMP. L. Q. II, 26; Conneaut-
ville Bank's Assigned Est., 280 Pa. 545, 548, 124 AtI. 745, 746 (1924).
3. In re Lebanon Trust & Safe Deposit Bank's Est., i66 Pa. 622, 31 Atl. 334 (x895);
Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co. (No. 1), 250 Pa. 372, 95 Ati. 574 (915) ; Pitts-
burgh's Appeal, 316 Pa. 125, 173 AtI. 288 (i934) ; Mehler's Appeal, 310 Pa. 25, 164 Atl. 619
(932), 81 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 888 (1933) ; Lifter v. Earle Co., 72 Pa. Super. 173 (igig).
4. Citing Mehler's Appeal, 310 Pa. 25, 164 AtI. 61g (932), 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 888
(933). See instant case at 207, 191 Atl. at 617.
5. Accord: Shumacher v. Harriett, 52 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1931) ; People ex rel.
Russell v. Iuka State Bank, 228 Ill. App. 4 (Ib23); Reichert v. United Savings Bank, 255
Mich. 685, 239 N. W. 393 (1931); Lane v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Ore. 350, 281 Pac. 172
(1929).
6. Instant case at 207, 191 Atl. at 617.
7. Even if the claimants were not allowed to pursue the funds in the cash items and
cash in other banks accounts, they could still participate as general creditors in the distribu-
tion of the remaining assets of the bank. See Newhouse v. First Nat. Bank, 13 F. (2d) 887,
89o (C. C. A. 7th, 1926) ; Johnson's Executors v. Johnson's Heirs, 83 W. Va. 593, 599, 98
S. E. 812, 814 (919).
8. The presumption was stated in Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696 (1879) (leading
case) ; Board of Commissioners v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907) ; Covey v. Can-
non, 104 Ark. 550, 149 S. W. 514 (912).
q. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 202, comment i.
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this point.1° Since the Restatement rejects the "first in first out" rule without
regard to the size of the balance, it may well be that the adoption of the Restate-
ment in the present case presages total rejection of the presumption in Pennsyl-
vania."
io. Instant case at 208, 191 AtI. at 618.
ii. For criticism of the presumption, see Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully
Mingled with Other Money (I913) 27 Hagv. L. REv. 125, 129; Covitt, The Legal Effect of
Insolvency on Bank Deposits (933) 8i U. OF PA. L. REV. 390, 403; Ames, Following Mis-
appropriated Property Into Its Product (igo6) I9 HAv. L. REv. 511, 518.
